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Museums are home to millions of artworks and cultural artifacts, some of which have 
made their way to these institutions through unjust means. Some argue that these 
objects should be repatriated (i.e., returned to their country, culture, or owner of ori-
gin). However, these arguments face a series of philosophical challenges. in particular, 
repatriation, even if justified, is often portrayed as contrary to the aims and values of 
museums. However, in this paper, i argue that some of the very considerations mu-
seums appeal to in order to oppose repatriation claims can be turned on their heads 
and marshaled in favor of the practice. in addition to defending against objections to 
repatriation, this argument yields the surprising conclusion that the redistribution of 
cultural goods should be much more radical than is typically supposed. 
1. Introduction
Museums are home to millions of artworks and cultural artifacts. The Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art alone holds two million objects. The Hermitage has three mil-
lion. The British Museum, eight million. Some of these objects have made their 
way to these institutions through unjust means. Some were stolen or plundered, 
others acquired through coerced or exploitative transactions. Should these injus-
tices be rectified, and if so, how? Some argue that there are objects in museum 
collections that should be repatriated, returned to their country, culture, or own-
er of origin. For instance, consider claims for the return of the Benin Bronzes, 
pillaged from the Benin Kingdom during the British Punitive expedition of 1897, 
or the abundance of claims for the return of native American cultural items that 
led to the passage of the native American Graves Protection and repatriation 
Act in 1990. According to claims like these, museums have a moral obligation to 
repatriate questionably acquired objects from their collections.
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However, there is a substantial literature spanning philosophy, law, and an-
thropology that explores the moral complications of the repatriation proposal. 
Objections to repatriation can be divided into roughly three kinds. First, there 
are metaphysical challenges concerning the continuity of cultural groups over 
time, which pose problems for determining to whom objects should be repatri-
ated. Second, there are epistemic challenges according to which limitations on 
our knowledge of the conditions under which objects were acquired render the 
justice of their acquisition unclear, potentially undermining the legitimacy of 
claims for repatriation. Finally, even if these first two challenges can be met, 
there are objections that question whether museums have an obligation to re-
patriate at all, especially given countervailing considerations concerning their 
institutional mission.
in this article, i attempt to avoid all three of these objections. i argue that 
the third objection can be met head- on, while the first two can be effectively 
sidestepped. i demonstrate this by arguing that a response to the historical injus-
tices of illicit art and artifact acquisition can be fruitfully embedded in a broader 
concern with pursuing a just distribution of cultural goods. Beyond defending 
against objections to repatriation, this argument yields the surprising conclusion 
that the redistribution of cultural resources should be much more radical than is 
typically supposed.
The article will proceed as follows. i begin by briefly outlining some of the 
most significant objections that have been presented against claims for repatria-
tion. discussion of repatriation in general, and in the philosophical literature 
in particular, is typically framed in the context of two related issues: cultural 
property and reparations for historical injustices. i will address those two frame-
works, and the objections that they generate, in Sections 2 and 3, illustrating the 
persistence of the three philosophical problems presented above. in Section 4, i 
introduce my argument in favor of embedding repatriation claims in a broader 
redistributive framework, and demonstrate how this approach avoids the objec-
tions raised in the previous sections. Section 5 concludes.
2. Cultural Property
repatriation claims are typically made on behalf of groups rather than individu-
als.1 This seems to require some understanding of a group as the rightful owner 
or possessor of an object, and hence appeal to the concept of cultural property. 
As Janna Thompson writes, “Cultural property is the property of a collectivity” 
1. The most common exception to this is nazi- looted art, where repatriation is often sought 
on behalf of individuals (or families).
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(2003: 252). Or as Kwame Anthony Appiah puts it, the idea “is that, in the sim-
plest terms, cultural property be regarded as the property of its culture” (2006: 
118). As Thompson cautions, the etymology of repatriation aside, it’s not clear 
that the relevant owners of cultural property should or must be states or other 
territorially bound collectives: a dispersed indigenous people, for instance, could 
be the rightful owners of cultural property (2003: 252). She suggests that, in a 
general sense, cultural property be understood as legitimately owned property 
that “plays an important role in the religious, cultural or political life of people 
of the collectivity” (Thompson 2003: 252).2
Thompson notes that her definition of cultural property places at least two 
limits on cultural property claims. First, “a collectivity cannot claim an artifact as 
its cultural property just because it was produced by its members. The item has 
to play an important role in its communal practices” (Thompson 2003: 253; cf. 
Young 2007: 115– 119). Second, “the definition also presupposes that claims will 
be made by collectives that are capable of acting as agents— organised groups 
like states, tribes, or churches” (Thompson 2003: 253). These limitations reveal 
respects in which Thompson’s definition of cultural property may be unduly 
narrow. With regard to the first limitation, it’s not clear that production by a 
member of a culture cannot be construed as grounding at least certain moral 
claims that might fit in the bundle of property rights.3 For instance, production 
by a member of a particular culture might delineate moral restrictions on how 
that product is used or represented by cultural outsiders, especially in the con-
text of appropriation of the product of a culturally marginalized group by mem-
bers of a culturally dominant group (Matthes 2016). This would not necessarily 
require that the product play an important role in communal practices.4
With respect to the second limitation, even if we grant that the relevant col-
lectives must be able to act as agents, this does not necessarily entail that the rel-
evant groups must be organized groups or “structured wholes” (ritchie 2015).5 if 
the relevant agential powers include, for instance, assertion and consent, recent 
philosophical scholarship suggests that informal groups could have such powers 
2. The more closely the identity of a group is linked with a particular item of cultural prop-
erty, the more likely those such as James Cuno might be to refer to it as “cultural patrimony,” 
which he says “is not something owned by a people, but something of them, a part of their defining 
collective identity” (2001: 85). According to this line of thinking, the more important an item is to a 
cultural group, the more likely it is to pass beyond the category of property, cultural or otherwise, 
altogether (Cuno 2001: 85).
3. For a comprehensive look at how cultural property might involve rights for non- title- 
holders, see Carpenter, Katyal, and riley (2009).
4. For further considerations in favor of a “cultural significance principle” for grounding cul-
tural property claims, see Young (2006; 2007).
5. Young also acknowledges that cultural property “does not require formal institutions,” 
though he appears to think this will only be an option for very small groups (Young 2007: 112).
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as well, granted that the authority to speak for the group will be acquired by simi-
larly informal means, such as lack of objection from other group members (Lackey 
2017). This qualification could thus provide an avenue for addressing questions 
about who decides to where an item of cultural property should be repatriated, 
even where the group in question is informal, heterogeneous, and dispersed.
The possibility of informal cultural group action raises the difficult question 
of who counts as a member of a cultural group.6 As James Young puts it, “it 
does not make much sense to talk about a culture owning property unless the 
members of the culture can be identified” (2007: 112). The practical applicability 
of the concept of cultural property to repatriation issues in particular seems to 
require addressing questions about cultural group membership. The question 
is especially pressing in the context of cultural property claims meant to apply 
across long periods of time, and hence across apparent cultural discontinuities. 
As Appiah cautions,
When nigerians claim a nok sculpture as part of their patrimony, they 
are claiming for a nation whose boundaries are less than a century old, 
the works of a civilization more than two millennia ago, created by a 
people that no longer exists, and whose descendants we know nothing 
about. (2006: 119).
Although cultural property claims concerning nations have an inherently politi-
cal dimension, it is striking that concerns about cultural discontinuity are often 
divorced from relevant features of the contemporary political context, as if the 
concept of cultural property ought to be applied universally, independently of 
facts about relative socio- political power. Appiah worries that the logic of cultural 
patrimony entails, for instance, that all norse goblets should be returned to nor-
way (2006: 121). Observations such as these are often intended as a reductio of the 
concept of cultural property. While i am critical of the type of nationalist retention 
policies that such a reading of cultural property can be used to justify (for reasons 
discussed in Section 4), i am skeptical about the idea that the concept of cultural 
property requires the kind of uniform application that would entail the cited con-
clusion about (e.g.) norse artifacts, especially at the level of nation- states. indeed, 
it’s revealing that Appiah pivots to an example concerning norway in making 
this claim— the purported absurdity of returning all norse goblets to norway is, 
i would suggest, subtly premised on the fact that norway has not been subject to 
the kind of colonialism that has prompted many claims for return of art and arti-
facts from other groups.7 The mistake stems from thinking that claims about cul-
6. For discussion, see, for example: Matthes (2015; 2016), narayan (1998), Patten (2014), Young (2008).
7. James Young helpfully notes that norway was governed by both denmark and Sweden at 
various points. While there are many examples of shifting sovereignty over nearby territories (as 
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tural property must be justified by appeal to a universal understanding of cultural 
products as the property of the particular culture that birthed them, independent-
ly of facts about socio- political power.8 But advocates of cultural property need 
not be committed to such a principle, any more than an opponent of cultural ap-
propriation must be committed to the claim that it is wrong for a native American 
to wear blue jeans (Matthes 2016; Todd 1990). Consistency only requires treating 
like cases alike, and principles that abstract away from the morally differentiating 
features of a case are distractions rather than objections.9
While the brief considerations here suggest that the concept of cultural 
property cannot be too hastily dismissed, they do not provide a solution to the 
problem of cultural group membership. indeed, that problem carries over to ap-
proaches to repatriation as a form of reparations for historical injustice, where 
additional challenges arise as well.
3. Repatriation as Reparations
A general argument for repatriation as a form of reparations can be framed as 
follows:
 1) establish an obligation to correct an historical injustice,
 2) establish an appropriate form of correction (viz., reparation),
 3) establish an appropriate means of reparation (viz., repatriation).10
Objections can be raised at each stage of this general argumentative framework.
in the case of Scandinavia), colonialism as i understand it here is characterized by either settlement 
or large- scale extraction of resources from a foreign land. in either case, there is an accompanying 
cultural domination that occurs through processes of displacement, appropriation, extermination, 
slavery, or extraction, which i take it were exacerbated by the supposed cultural and racial supe-
riority of european colonists. While i am sure that more local changes in sovereignty in Scandina-
via had cultural consequences as well, given the relative cultural similarities of the Scandinavian 
countries, i do not think we’re dealing with the same phenomenon that we see in european colo-
nialism on other continents. For relevant discussion, see Kohn and reddy (2017). For a similar con-
trast between Scandinavian nations and european colonialism of other continents in the context of 
museums and cultural heritage, see Atkinson (2014: 48).
8. indeed, from a legal perspective, “cultural property is partially intended to repair the rup-
tures associated with a history of colonization and capture” (Carpenter et al. 2009: 1033). Moreover, 
the very concept of cultural property emerged largely in the context of thinking about the ethics of 
war, hardly an apolitical context for theorizing. For historical context, see Merryman (1986).
9. it of course remains possible that considerations of contemporary socio- political power 
should be regarded as irrelevant to our understanding of cultural property, but that conclusion 
should be argued for, not merely assumed in our understanding of the concept itself.
10. This framework is based on one provided in Björnberg (2014: 463).
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3.1. Establishing Unjust Acquisition
Karin Björnberg outlines three examples of ways in which the acquisition of a 
cultural artifact might be unjust: (1) illegal acquisitions (where immorality is 
inferred from illegality), (2) “improper agreement” (where the acquisition is pri-
ma facie consensual, but coerced or exploitative), and (3) third- party transfer by 
someone who is not the owner and thus does not have the moral right to trans-
fer the artifact (Björnberg 2014: 464). An extension of Björnberg’s third example 
would make appeal to the concept of cultural property: one might argue that an 
acquisition is unjust because the artifact is not subject to individual ownership 
by anyone, and thus cannot justly be transferred by any individual, including 
a person who belongs to the relevant culture (cf. Thompson 2003: 255). By in-
troducing the concept of inalienable cultural property, the same claim could be 
applied to groups as a whole as well (Coleman 2010).
Björnberg suggests it will often be difficult to establish whether artifacts 
were acquired unjustly, in which case a specifically reparative claim for repatria-
tion cannot be made (though she notes that this does not necessarily undermine 
other non- reparative arguments for repatriation) (2014: 464). The 1970 uneSCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the illicit import, export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property established stricter guidelines 
for the documentation of archaeological finds and artifact acquisitions such that 
we can defeasibly infer that unprovenanced artifacts acquired after 1970 were 
unjustly acquired; however, this offers no help when it comes to determining the 
justice of acquisition for the millions of objects already in institutional collections 
prior to 1970. So, substantial uncertainty often remains.
3.2. Establishing the Appropriateness of Reparations
if we grant that unjust acquisition can be established, and that unjust actions 
ought to be remedied, we are then faced with establishing that reparations per se 
are the appropriate form of remedy for addressing the historical injustice. This 
approach requires that we determine to whom reparations are owed.
if the individuals from whom artifacts were unjustly acquired are still alive, 
the answer to this question is straightforward. However, for cases involving 
unjust acquisition in the further past, we face a problem. if the former owners 
of unjustly acquired artifacts are deceased, then it seems reparations cannot be 
made to them.11 So, this fact can lead us to question whether reparations are the 
appropriate form of redress for the historical injustice, unless we can establish 
11. Though some argue that reparations might be owed to the dead. For instance, see ridge 
(2003).
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that reparation to some other party will itself satisfy the obligation of redress. 
in other words, are there “moral descendants” of those who were originally 
wronged, to whom reparations would rectify the wrong in question? This way 
of posing the question leaves open whether the relevant descendants are biologi-
cal descendants or cultural/political descendants.
Björnberg adapts two ways of understanding the “transfer of victimization” 
from Bernard Boxill’s work on reparations for slavery in the u.S. (Björnberg 2014: 
465; Boxill 2003). According to Boxill’s “harm argument,” past harms can initiate 
a chain of harms that continue to harm people today. So the unjust acquisition 
of artifacts not only harmed their owners at that time, but also initiated a chain 
of events that harms people in the present. According to Boxill’s “inheritance 
argument,” victims of historical injustice were owed reparations that they did 
not receive, and the right to be compensated is inherited by their descendants. 
So the unjust acquisition of artifacts should have been redressed in the past, and 
the right to have that past injustice remedied redounds to the descendants of the 
initial wrong.
According to Björnberg, both the harm argument and the inheritance argu-
ment require identifying the “legitimate descendants” of the original victims 
(2014: 465).12 While this is clearly a pressing task for advocates of the inheritance 
argument, its application to the harm argument is less straightforward. On at 
least one reading of the harm argument, the legitimate descendants of the origi-
nal victims are identified by the fact that we can trace a present harm to the past 
harm in question, not the other way around.13 To be sure, it may still be difficult 
to adequately demonstrate the relevant causal chain of harm, so identifying the 
legitimate descendants may well still be difficult. But we should be clear that 
this approach reveals who the moral descendants of past victims are, rather than 
presupposing it.
With respect to identifying legitimate descendants for the purposes of the in-
heritance argument, Björnberg suggests that we can appeal to arguments about 
national self- determination that emphasize the bonds of common culture (2014: 
466). However, this approach pushes us back onto the problem of cultural group 
membership. Looking to cultural continuity may well be a promising direction 
to take, but it leaves a substantial philosophical task to be addressed.
12. Björnberg also considers objections that apply only to the harm argument: the non- 
identity objection and the counterfactual objection. As Björnberg notes, neither of these objections 
are particularly compelling in the context of cultural artifacts, so i will not discuss them here.
13. An alternative reading might suggest that we first identify the legitimate descendants, 
and we can then infer that they are therefore harmed by the very fact that they are the legitimate 
descendants. But this seems ad hoc and not in the spirit of the argument: there should be some 
identifiable harm that we can point to on this approach. note that the inheritance argument is not 
likewise subject to this concern, because inheriting the right to reparation does not require also 
inheriting the harm of the original injustice.
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3.3. Establishing Repatriation as the Appropriate Means of Reparation
Assuming that reparations are indeed called for in response to an historical in-
justice, and the legitimate recipients of the reparations can be identified, it re-
mains to be established that repatriation is the appropriate means of reparation. 
Given that our topic is the unjust acquisition of art and artifacts, the idea that 
repatriation is the appropriate means of reparation has significant intuitive ap-
peal: stolen goods should be returned. Another common means of reparation is 
compensation, but this seems most appropriate in contexts where the original 
harm in question cannot otherwise be repaired (because, for instance, an item 
has been destroyed, or the harm was pain and suffering, or originally financial 
in nature). For instance, if someone steals my car, then they ought to give it back, 
not just compensate me for its monetary value: indeed, i could not justifiably 
demand compensation instead of return of the vehicle (Simmons 1995: 167). Art 
and artifacts in particular are often regarded as irreplaceable, and whether or not 
this is strictly true, they can certainly have a value that resists straightforward 
replacement with financial compensation (see Matthes 2013).
However, even if it is true that repatriation is the most appropriate means of 
reparation for the unjust acquisition of art and artifacts, some argue that these 
repatriation claims can be outweighed by competing considerations (Björnberg 
2014: 472; Thompson 2003: 257; Young 2007: 122). These can range from claims 
about the supersession of historical injustice, to the prioritization of preservation, 
to the outstanding value of objects and their consequent interest to all of human-
ity. This latter point is a particularly common invocation made by proponents of 
institutional retention. As Thompson puts it, “The case for return can be more or 
less strong, and often an appeal to [universal] human values will favour the posi-
tion of the museum directors” (2003: 261). The key point here is that repatriation is 
typically viewed as contrary to the interests of museums and other cultural insti-
tutions, especially with respect to their mission of serving the public interest. it is 
thus thought that repatriation claims must be quite strong in order to be decisive, 
strong enough to outweigh these significant competing considerations.
4. Repatriation and the Just Distribution of Cultural Goods
The forgoing overview of philosophical challenges for repatriation suggests the 
following three central issues must be addressed:
First, the legitimate descendants of historical injustices are often uncertain, 
due in part to worries about cultural continuity over time. if we cannot identify 
the individuals to whom reparations are legitimately owed, then we will not 
know to whom artworks and artifacts should be repatriated.
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Second, there will often be ambiguity surrounding the justice (or lack there-
of) of artifact acquisition. if we are uncertain whether an object was unjustly 
acquired, then it will not be clear whether repatriation of the object is warranted.
Finally, even if these first two challenges can be addressed and a legitimate 
claim for repatriation established, some argue that these repatriation claims can 
be outweighed by competing considerations. in particular, it is often claimed 
that repatriation is contrary to the values and mission of museums and cultural 
institutions.
in what follows, i argue that all of these challenges can be met. in order to 
do this, i will briefly pivot away from direct discussion of repatriation in order 
to focus on the aims of museums and cultural institutions, and the purportedly 
universal human values that they endeavor to serve. i will use these aims to 
introduce considerations of distributive justice into our thinking about cultural 
goods, which in turn offers an opportunity for repatriation to reenter the picture. 
in the end, i submit we will have an argument in favor of the radical redistribu-
tion of cultural goods in which repatriation has an important role to play, and in 
which the major philosophical challenges identified above are addressed.
4.1. Cultural Goods and Universal Values
Museums and cultural institutions tend to embrace the idea, enshrined in the 
Hague Convention of 1954, that cultural products are contributions to the cul-
ture of all humankind. As the preamble to that text reads: “damage to cultural 
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural 
heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture 
of the world” (As quoted in Merryman 1986: 836). This sentiment is echoed in 
a 1982 uneSCO convention addressing artifacts and sites that are considered 
part of world heritage: “Their value cannot be confined to one nation or to one 
people, but is there to be shared by every man, woman and child of the globe” 
(As quoted in Omland 2006: 247). Such commitments concerning the universal 
value of cultural products are often marshaled against claims for repatriation. As 
Thompson puts it, “The argument advanced by those who think that museums 
are within their rights to resist restitution claims is that some artefacts are of 
such great value for humanity that it is justified to restrict or override rights of 
cultural property in order to promote or protect this value” (2003: 257).14
14. it is worth noting here that some might question the idea that cultural goods have the 
kind of universal humanistic value that museums claim, and upon which this argument is pre-
mised. However, in line with Thompson’s comment, if we decided to give up on this premise, then 
one (if not the only) major institutional objection to repatriation claims disappears. So the result is 
a stronger argument for repatriation either way, albeit without the broader distributive framework 
in the latter case.
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However, despite often being pitted in favor of institutional retention, if we 
take seriously the claim that art and artifacts have a kind of universal value, then 
it seems that we need to think carefully about the just distribution of such cul-
tural goods. After all, we typically think that “universal human values” are such 
that lack of access to them can constitute an injustice. As Thompson writes, “if 
we think of art as being of value for individual development and to humankind 
as a whole, then distributional issues cannot be avoided” (2004: 558– 559). She is 
focused specifically on an argument against certain nationalist cultural retention 
policies, but the same point can serve as a stepping- stone toward broader reflec-
tion on the distribution of cultural goods.15
Principles of distributive justice are typically invoked in the context of goods 
that are held privately. For instance, insofar as systems of taxation are justified 
by principles of distributive justice, they bear on goods that are held privately, 
namely, individual wealth. Public goods, on the other hand, are not often re-
garded as subject to principles of distributive justice. in discussing this feature 
of the literature, david Miller notes, “one possible explanation is that since these 
goods are available equally to everyone, no issue of justice arises” (2004: 129). He 
explains that this line of argument does not pay sufficient attention to the fact 
that equally available goods may not be equally used or valued, but i want to 
pause on the feature of equal availability. insofar as it is in the nature of public 
goods (whether or not such a designation is purely conventional16) to be equally 
available, principles of distributive justice will apply strongly to goods that are 
designated as public but whose access is, restricted, whether de facto or de jure.
it is clear that the major art museums of the West view themselves less as 
owners of private goods than as stewards of public goods. Although some may 
charge fees for entry, the museum does not have the right to exclude anyone 
from access.17 Moreover, it is also clear that these museums consider the public 
good of their collections in a cosmopolitan, as opposed to nationalist, light. For 
instance, in the “declaration of the importance and Value of universal Muse-
ums,” a group of museum leaders including the directors of the Met, the Getty, 
the Hermitage, and the British museum write, “Museums serve not just the citi-
zens of one nation but the people of every nation.”18 indeed, some cultural orga-
15. This comes up again in Thompson (2010: 254– 255). She suggests there that the idea of 
culture as “‘the property of humanity’ seems to weaken the hold over them of the possessing na-
tion” (2010: 254– 255). Yes and no. it might weaken the mere claim that given cultural properties 
should be possessed because that is the status quo, but, as she somewhat acknowledges in the next 
paragraph, what it really does is activate a positive consideration of distributive justice that might 
outweigh the status quo.
16. This is Miller’s view. For a response, see Lindsay (2012).
17. in this sense, art and cultural resources are not “pure public goods,” but qualify as public 
nonetheless. See Miller (2004: 128, Footnote 122).
18. “declaration of the importance and Value of universal Museums” (2004).
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nizations have even construed access to these goods in terms of human rights. 
For instance, in a 2016 declaration, the united nations Human rights Council 
writes, “Convinced that damage to cultural heritage, both tangible and intangi-
ble, of any people constitutes damage to the cultural heritage of humanity as a 
whole; Noting that the destruction of or damage to cultural heritage may have a 
detrimental and irreversible impact on the enjoyment of cultural rights, in par-
ticular the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, including the ability to 
access and enjoy cultural heritage.”19 Combining these two claims suggests a 
human right to a universal human heritage.
data concerning the global distribution of art is surprisingly difficult to find. 
But facts about the locations of the world’s largest museums, in concert with 
facts about the imperial origins of encyclopedic museums in general, strongly 
indicates that the distribution of global museum holdings is skewed significant-
ly towards “Western” institutions. However, if the goods that museums hold 
are public goods with universal value, goods everyone may even have a human 
right to access and experience, then we need to ask whether the current distribu-
tion of these goods is just.
For the purposes of this discussion, i want to leave open the thorny question 
of what precise principles of justice might govern the distribution of cultural 
goods: this will depend largely on what the correct theory of distributive justice 
in general turns out to be. Suffice it to say that, given the radical inequality of 
the current global distribution of institutionally held cultural resources, most 
any reasonable principle would entail an extensive redistribution of these goods, 
emptying the vast storerooms of Western museums and sharing their resourc-
es around the world.20 But rather than address what precisely this distribution 
should look like, i want to focus here on the way in which repatriation might 
reenter the picture once the matter of a just distribution of cultural goods is on 
the table.
As suggested, the distribution of institutional cultural goods is skewed to-
wards Western nations and cultural groups and away from others.21 But more-
over, that distribution has a particular character. That Western museums have a 
long history of cultural marginalization should come as no surprise. examples 
include the exclusion of non- Western artworks to anthropology museums as 
19. united nations (2016). note that the language of the first clause echoes the language of 
the 1954 Hague Convention, quoted above.
20. i am assuming here that principles of distributive justice apply across borders, though the 
possibility of global distributive justice remains contentious in the literature. For an overview, see 
Brock (2017).
21. This should of course not be confused with a claim that suggests that non- Western nations 
are culturally impoverished: the focus here is on a particular kind of cultural good held by muse-
ums and like institutions. This is consistent with the obvious existence of rich cultural practices 
around the world.
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opposed to art museums, their designation as “primitive” within the artworld 
context, and, despite these aspersions on their artistic status, the colonialist ac-
quisition of many such objects (eaton & Gaskell 2012; nicholas & Wylie 2013). 
So the current distribution of cultural resources is both a product and reflection 
of, among other things, cultural domination.
The unequal distribution of these cultural goods thus not only indicates the 
need for redistribution in light of museums’ own values and commitments, but 
moreover, the character of the current distribution suggests that a fitting ap-
proach to redistribution should be sensitive where possible to how such an effort 
can aid in counteracting the social marginalization with which the current distri-
bution is entangled (Glass 2004). in other words, we should thus consider how 
the redistribution of cultural resources can facilitate recognition for historically 
and currently marginalized groups.22
As has been argued in other contexts, achieving recognition in justice can 
require restorative justice, or reparation (Figueroa & Waitt 2010). it is difficult 
to achieve recognition in an institutional system that is based on the systematic 
subordination of other cultures without an attempt to redress the historical roots 
of that system. However, the distributive inequities of cultural goods go beyond 
any specific instances of unjust acquisition we might identify. institutional com-
mitment to the universal value of cultural goods suggests that, whatever the just 
distribution of cultural goods ultimately is, the redistribution of those goods to 
cultural communities that have been historically marginalized with respect to 
their access to these goods will be much broader than just the return of certain 
looted or coercively acquired artifacts. indeed, contrary to the cultural property 
narrative that associates repatriation with nationalism, strong cultural retention 
policies would be anathema to the broader patterns of distributive justice in cul-
tural goods that we ought to endeavor to secure.23 For example, if paradigmatic 
22. nancy Fraser’s work on recognition in justice is an important touchstone here. Fraser 
adopts a “status model” of recognition, according to which lack of recognition is a matter of in-
stitutionalized subordination rather than “an impediment to ethical self- realization,” as philoso-
phers such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth construe it. Thus, as she puts it, claims for recogni-
tion are a matter of justice that “aim . . . to deinstitutionalize patterns of cultural value that impede 
parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it” (Fraser & Honneth 2003: 
30). However, Fraser treats redistribution and recognition as related but distinct, to the extent 
that problems of maldistribution or misrecognition cannot “be redressed indirectly . . . through 
remedies addressed exclusively to the other” (23). i leave aside here what further efforts might be 
required to achieve recognition of marginalized culture groups, but my argument supports the 
idea, in slight tension with Fraser, that indirect redress for misrecognition can, at least partially, be 
achieved through appropriate forms of redistribution.
23. it is important to remember that when museums and other institutions object to repatria-
tion of art and artifacts based on the idea that these items belong to “all of humanity,” they are not 
objecting to the concept of cultural property per se, but rather, objecting to the scope of its applica-
tion in a particular context. indeed, they are using the logic of cultural property to assert that a 
relevant bundle of rights over the artifacts in question belongs to everyone specifically in virtue of 
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instances of Mexican or egyptian art have universal human value, then extant 
policies that prohibit the export of these goods are also unjust, at least in this 
respect.24 This entails that not all plausible repatriation claims will ultimately 
be satisfied on this approach; however, as i will continue to argue, it provides 
some novel avenues for the return of objects as a component of achieving a just 
distribution. Given the current pattern in holdings, this approach promises an 
overwhelmingly different distribution of institutional cultural goods, even if not 
all objects are repatriated.25
Because redistribution should aim to correct both the regional and numerical 
inequity of the current distribution, as well as the colonial character of that dis-
tribution, a fitting solution cannot simply involve attempts to maximize access 
to institutional cultural goods based on population. While an adequate response 
to these twin problems will certainly increase global access to cultural goods on 
the whole (for instance, by redistributing Western collections to high- population 
former colonies in Asia and Africa), sometimes correcting the colonial charac-
ter of the distribution will be at odds with purely maximizing access. For in-
stance, intranational redistribution that facilitates access to indigenous artifacts 
for indigenous communities may often not increase access to those objects for 
larger populations in general.26 However, given that the processes that led to 
institutional holdings in indigenous artifacts are inseparable from the processes 
that decimated indigenous populations, the fact that improving access for indig-
enous people will not numerically increase access overall is expected, and not a 
weighty objection. Moreover, at the scale of cultural groups as opposed to pure 
population, such efforts could still increase access for culturally marginalized 
communities.27
So, to take stock of where we are so far: The current distribution of cultural 
goods is contrary to some of the explicit values of museums and cultural institu-
the shared culture of humanity (Merryman 1986: 831). Peter Lindsay claims, moreover, that both 
appeals are grounded in identity claims (Lindsay 2012).
24. Perhaps such policies have justification as a check on looting, but that is largely an empiri-
cal question.
25. i assume that repatriation will require ceding control over the relevant objects and that 
this is an essential element, along with increasing access, to achieving justice in recognition. How-
ever, i leave open the possibility that Western museums might in some cases maintain partner-
ships that would facilitate access and allow these institutions a continued role in actively pursuing 
their mission. i leave further reflection on the complicated matter of control for future work.
26. For relevant discussion concerning intranational cultural property issues and indigenous 
communities, see Watkins (2005). Moreover, repatriation of some indigenous artifacts will be flatly 
inconsistent with increasing access if the artifacts in question are intended for privileged access, 
or will subsequently be left to decay, such as the Zuni War God sculptures, as discussed in Young 
(2008: 98– 99). However, i take it that such artifacts should clearly never have been subject to insti-
tutional control in the first place, and thus we might accept that meeting these culturally specific 
needs will be lexically prior to the institutional redistribution recommended here.
27. Thanks to Shen- yi Liao for pressing me on this point.
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tions. indeed, the assignment of universal vale to these collections suggests that 
they should be subject to principles of global distributive justice. Moreover, the 
character of the current distribution of such goods, which is produced by and 
reflective of patterns of cultural marginalization, points to redistribution as a 
(at least partial) means of redressing this subordinated status. independently of 
what specific principles of distribution ultimately ought to apply, these consid-
erations together lend support to the idea that justice will require radical redis-
tribution of cultural goods throughout the world, in part based on their value 
to humanity, but guided as well by the unjust history of their acquisition: this 
scheme will thus involve both de facto and de jure instances of repatriation. in 
practice, this will mean that access to representative collections of cultural goods 
from a wide array of cultural contexts be made available to a much broader 
population of cultural consumers around the world.28 in the next section, i will 
explain how the proposal avoids the persistent objections to repatriation pre-
sented above.
Although my proposal may seem extreme, it is striking to see that versions of 
it are latent in the work of some opponents of repatriation themselves, though to 
my knowledge, never fully developed. For instance, in Merryman’s classic treat-
ment of cultural property, he levies the universal value of cultural heritage in 
order to support an “internationalist” or “cosmopolitan” approach that criticizes 
nationalist policies of retention that inhibit the free flow of cultural resources 
around the world (Merryman 1986). However, as rosemary Coombe has noted, 
Merryman seems less willing to credence the implications of such an approach 
when applied to major Western museums and holdings in cultural resources:
One suspects, however, that Merryman would likely object to the move-
ment of rembrandts from the netherlands to Lagos, despite the fact that 
rembrandt’s paintings might be “over- represented” in their country 
of origin where they cannot possibly be put to their full use, that the 
dutch “fail to spread their culture” to the Third World, and that they 
thereby “contribute to the cultural impoverishment of people” in Africa. 
The existence of vast and seldom displayed holdings in european and 
north American museums does not appear to have led to any movement 
amongst “cultural internationalists” to establish better museums in nia-
28. One might ask why increasing access requires moving art rather than moving people. i 
take it that substantially increasing access to cultural goods while keeping those goods highly con-
centrated in their current locations is infeasible. One might also ask about whether access through 
digitization might meet the relevant aims. While i support open digital access to museum collec-
tions, the very resistance to redistribution of original objects themselves suggests that increasing 
access merely through digitization would be inadequate. For some discussion in the context of 
repatriation to indigenous communities, see Crouch (2010).
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mey, Lima, or nanjing despite the vastly larger numbers of people whose 
“cultural impoverishment” might thereby be alleviated by exposure to 
the sublime. The “cosmopolitan” attitude Merryman espouses appears 
more eurocentric than worldly, more monocultural than respectful of 
cultural difference, and less concerned with the purported “interests of 
all mankind” than with the interests of maintaining Western hegemony. 
(Coombe 1993: 161– 162)
On a similar note, Young, who is skeptical about many grounds for repatria-
tion claims, does argue in favor of an “access principle,” according to which one 
relevant consideration in adjudicating cultural property claims will be how well 
possession facilitates access “to all those persons for whom it has value” (2008: 
99). He writes,
it is worth noting, in the context of a mention of the access principle, 
that the basements of the museums of the world are full of undisplayed, 
unstudied, and unappreciated works of art. The Victoria and Albert Mu-
suem, for example, houses the largest collection of indian art outside of 
india, approximately 40,000 artifacts. Very few of these items are on dis-
play. undisplayed items might be highly valued in another context. An 
artwork that languishes in the basement of the British Museum, might 
be a prized exhibit in Haida Gwaii or the Solomon islands. (Young 2008: 
99– 100)
These reflections are in principle friendly to my argument here, though as i have 
noted and will continue to argue, i believe that when embedded in consideration 
of the just distribution of cultural resources they have much more extensive im-
plications than Young seems to think.
Björnberg, in her reparations- based discussion of repatriation, notes that 
other frameworks besides that of reparations need more attention including 
“the argument that, for utilitarian reasons, valuable cultural artefacts ought to be 
more justly distributed among the world’s nations” (2014: 473).29 even philoso-
phers such as Appiah, who are critical of nationalist repatriation efforts, seem in 
principle friendly to this proposal. “i’d rather that we negotiated as restitution 
not just the major objects of significance for our history, things that make the 
best sense in the palace museum at Manhyia, but a decent collection of art from 
around the world” (Appiah 2006: 133).30 So, although my proposal may seem 
29. My argument is of course not utilitarian, and bears a relationship to issues of reparation, 
as opposed to functioning as an independent alternative.
30. The idea that this proposal presents a “sort of synthesis of the call for culture- specific 
reclamation and the push towards immersion in the many cultures of the world” is also identified 
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outlandish at first glance, it is important to see that the seeds of the idea are 
planted even among some of repatriation’s opponents and skeptics.
One might worry that redistributing cultural goods in this manner will be 
inconsistent with other museum values, such as preservation, based on the con-
cern that other less affluent nations may not be in a good position to care for 
these resources (Young 2008: 99). While this will sometimes be a relevant con-
sideration, museums are always faced with balancing preservation with access, 
so it is at least not a new problem. Moreover, such arguments have historically 
been used to justify the acquisition of cultural goods based on particular Western 
notions of what cultural preservation requires.31 Finally, Western storage facili-
ties are not always as ideal as one might assume. For instance, they can be in-
adequate in size and condition.32 They can also be subject to threats such as war 
and extreme weather.33 So while considerations of preservation should provide 
a check on redistributive schemes, and the selection of future collection sites 
should be sensitive to the preservation of objects, we should be wary of over-
playing worries about preservation as a decisive objection to this proposal. The 
fact that redistribution of cultural goods might not be immediately possible due 
to current practical limitations does not undermine its normative significance as 
a future goal.
4.2. Redistribution, Repatriation, and Particularized Shares
Hopefully, it is already clear that the proposal i have argued for avoids the third 
major philosophical challenge to repatriation that i identified above. it demon-
strates that repatriation is not inconsistent with museum values concerning the 
stewardship of public goods for the sake of an international audience; on the 
contrary, combined with considerations of justice, institutional commitments 
concerning the universal value of cultural goods entail a much more radical re-
distribution than even repatriation claims alone would warrant. i now want to 
argue that this proposal also allows us to avoid the other two lingering philo-
sophical challenges for repatriation: ambiguity concerning the justice of acquisi-
tion, and uncertainty concerning cultural continuity.
i take it as granted that in cases where cultural goods were clearly unjustly 
acquired, repatriation to groups that are clearly continuous with the original vic-
in Jeffers (2013: 509).
31. For relevant discussion see Kersel (2016), Warren (1989), Wylie (2005).
32. For discussion in the context of archaeological collections, see Kersel (2015). Kersel docu-
ments some examples of the redistribution and deacessioning of over- taxed collections that are 
friendly to the theoretical argument i offer her.
33. Significant portions of the Smithsonian collections were moved during World War ii out 
of fear that Washington would be targeted. See Smithsonian institution Archives (n.d.).
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tims of the unjust acquisition will be required. This should be evident simply on 
the basis of common norms of reparative justice, though embedding them within 
the broader context of the redistribution of cultural goods reveals another way in 
which they are consistent with the evaluative commitments of museums.34 Given 
that some artworks and cultural artifacts are rare or unique, it is appropriate that 
those who were deprived of such objects via unjust means should have them re-
turned in the process of broader redistribution. Clearly, the return of all objects 
that might be construed as the cultural property of a particular group will be in-
consistent with the broader distributive aims of the approach that i am advocat-
ing (as mentioned above with respect to nationalist retention policies). But this 
does not mean that a just redistribution should be insensitive to the historical facts 
about how the current distribution came about. As A. John Simmons notes in dis-
cussing the historical rights of native Americans to unjustly seized lands,
Their rights are not, i think, just rights to some fair share of American 
resources; they are rights to a particular (or a particularized) fair share. 
Treating native American rights as exclusively end- state rights means 
denying that the actual arguments made by native American tribes for 
historical rights to particular lands and resources have any moral force at 
all, or any appeal beyond ungrounded emotionalism. (1995: 174)
The notion of a “particularized share” is important. Simmons defines a particu-
larized share as “a right to a certain- sized share of a particular set of holdings— 
namely, to a share of the holdings of the wrongdoer” (Simmons 1995: 162). He 
notes that the notion of a particularized share can be invoked in contexts where 
a stolen item has been destroyed, or when even legitimate holdings are “down-
sized.” But of most relevance for our purposes, Simmons points to the power of 
this notion for contexts of rectifying injustice under conditions of uncertainty:
The theory also gives us some reason to believe that the problem of rec-
tifying complicated injustices may not be insoluble in principle. For even 
if we cannot say precisely to what particular thing some individual or 
group is entitled, we can now see that just rectification may be achieved 
in such a case by redistribution within a range of appropriate outcomes. 
(Simmons 1995: 166)
This approach thus gives us the resources to address repatriation issues under 
contexts of uncertainty regarding the just acquisition of artifacts.
34. it is worth noting that even when these conditions are met, museums sometimes resist 
return of stolen items, claiming ignorance. See Bennett (2017).
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For example, many artifacts (and human remains) were looted from native 
American burials and communities, and thus lack a well- documented prove-
nance (Harjo 1996). despite knowledge of this history, this very lack of docu-
mentation can generate uncertainty about the nature of the acquisition, and thus 
introduce the possibility that it was purchased or licitly discovered. even if there 
is documentation that suggests a lawful sale, the just acquisition of the item in 
question may still be regarded as ambiguous. On the one hand, we may want 
to acknowledge the possibility of autonomous agency even under the yoke of 
colonialism. On the other hand, we may worry that the colonial power dynamics 
in the transaction have undermined the legitimacy of the acquisition (Björnberg 
2014: 464; Coleman, Coombe, & MacArailt 2012: 199; Walsh & Lopes 2012: 226– 
227). Simmons’s notion of a particularized share allows us to sidestep the uncer-
tainty in such cases. Given the known injustices (and of particular salience here, 
cultural injustices) carried out against native Americans by colonists, we can 
claim that a particular group, say, is entitled to a particularized share of museum 
holdings that includes items of the relevant type, even if a specific item cannot 
with certainty be identified as one to which they have a claim. While this does 
not guarantee the return of this particular artifact, it does guarantee the return 
of a particularized share of artifacts, which may well include this one in the end. 
This is a far superior way of navigating uncertainty about the just acquisition 
of artifacts relative to contemporary practice, which tends to just default to the 
status quo. Merryman, who argues that the burden of proof is on the claimant to 
establish unjust acquisition, a commitment enshrined in the u.S.’s 1990 native 
American Graves Protection and repatriation Act, explicitly advocates such a 
“principle of repose” (Harding 1997: 732).
As this example indicates, the approach that i argue for here will have partic-
ular appeal for repatriation claims set against the backdrop of colonial and impe-
rial relationships. Given the role that these processes played in the establishment 
of Western museums, it will thus cover many relevant cases. it will consequently 
have less to say about, for instance, a claim for repatriation from another West-
ern nation where the justice of acquisition is unclear. This is in keeping with my 
broader conclusion that the concept of cultural property is best understood as a 
political notion set against a backdrop of historical injustice, and my opposition 
to nationalist retention policies as inconsistent with a just distribution of cultural 
goods.
This approach also dovetails nicely with Lea Ypi’s (2013) recent work on the 
wrong of colonialism. Ypi argues that the wrong of colonialism is best explained 
by “the creation and upholding of a political association that denies its members 
equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation,” rather than by reference to national-
ism or appeals to territorial rights (2013: 158). Thus the pursuit of recognition 
in response to such historical injustices may require the repatriation of some 
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objects independently of the strength of claims to particular items. As she puts 
it, we might return certain items or access to lands
because in some cases the best way to make amends for our past wrong-
ful behavior is to grant people what they want, regardless of why they 
want it and even if what they want is not something they may have been 
entitled to in the first place. (Ypi 2013: 187)35
i am less skeptical about claims to territorial rights than Ypi, but paired with 
Simmons's understanding of particularized shares, we see here further support 
for the idea of repatriation justified by the pursuit of recognition within a re-
distributive scheme, even in the face of uncertainty regarding just acquisition 
concerning particular artifacts.
We can now turn to the problem of cultural continuity. First, it is important 
to note that the problem of cultural continuity is unlikely to arise for any re-
patriation claim that is based on a fairly recent unjust acquisition, rather than 
grounded solely in applying a nationalist conception of cultural property. For 
instance, egyptian claims for the bust of nefertiti, acquired by Germany in the 
early 20th century, do not require demonstrating cultural continuity with An-
cient egyptians if the claim concerns unjust acquisition rather than a nationalist 
cultural property claim (Björnberg 2014: 466).
Second, the broad redistribution of cultural goods has the happy conse-
quence of increasing access to a diverse array of cultural goods for a wide set 
of groups, regardless of how we sort out more difficult questions concerning 
cultural continuity. Moreover, worries about cultural continuity are typically 
marshaled in order to support maintaining the status quo distribution.36 Since 
the status quo will be upended on the approach i advocate, and it is not tied to 
nationalist conceptions of cultural property, it is not clear that the question of 
cultural continuity remains relevant: there will be de facto repatriation (of many, 
though necessarily, not all objects) through redistribution, independently of the 
need to establish strong links of cultural continuity where such relationships 
might be uncertain.
Finally, there are some cases where cultural continuity will continue to be 
relevant, but the notion of a particularized share may again be used as a concep-
tual resource. For instance, there are native American repatriation cases where 
the claim is challenged because it is purported that the relevant cultural group 
no longer exists and lacks continuity with contemporary groups.37 However, 
35. For a similar point, see Harding (1997: 739).
36. For an extended defense of the status quo, see Jenkins (2016).
37. The most infamous case is no doubt that of “The Ancient One” or “Kennewick Man,” 
though this case concerns human remains rather than artifacts. For a brief overview, see TallBear 
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given the relationship between colonialism and the eradication of native Ameri-
can cultural groups, we might advocate for the return of artifacts to a “particu-
larized” cultural group (e.g., another tribe), even if the particular source culture 
is claimed to no longer exist.
5. Conclusion
i have argued that the three persistent challenges to repatriation can be avoided 
by embedding claims for repatriation in a broader framework concerning justice 
in cultural goods. rather than thinking that the aims and values of museums 
are contrary to repatriation claims, i have argued that, coupled with principles 
of distributive justice, they actually entail the need for repatriation as part of a 
wide redistribution of cultural goods. Moreover, i have also highlighted how 
this approach avoids undesirable nationalist retention policies, which are often 
thought to follow from repatriation claims derived from appeal to the concept 
of cultural property. Museums and cultural institutions have the power to take 
substantial steps in pursuit of justice in cultural goods. if my argument is correct, 
then they ought to exercise that power.
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